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Participation Rights of Preferred Stockholders
By L. L. Briggs

The terms of a preferred-stock contract may provide that after
payment of the preferred dividend the holders of this stock may
be entitled to share equally with the common stockholders in any
further dividends that may be declared or that they may share in
dividends declared after the holders of the common stock have
received a dividend equal to that of the preferred. The preferred
certificate may also prohibit further participation in profits after
the holders have received their stipulated dividend.
When there is no provision at all in the preferred contract in
regard to the disposition of earnings left after the preferred stock
holders are paid their contractual dividend, misunderstandings
may arise because the contract may be interpreted as limiting
these shareholders to this amount or it may be interpreted as not
having such a limitation. Most of the corporate instruments
merely state that certain shareholders shall be entitled to a speci
fied preferential dividend and contain no provision as to what shall
be done with the balance of the surplus earnings available for
distribution as dividends.
Some writers on corporation law and the leading legal encyclo
pedias state that unless the corporate instruments provide other
wise, preferred and common stockholders participate equally in any
distribution of profits after both the preferred and the common
shareholders have received a dividend equal to that provided
for in the preferred contract. A careful study of the court deci
sions on the point leads me to the conclusion that this is not an
accurate statement of the law in all jurisdictions. It is the rule
that is followed in some states but it is not the law in others. The
point is still unsettled in a majority of the states because it has
not come before their highest courts. So far as I have been able
to determine, the supreme court of the United States has never
had occasion to rule upon it.
A review of the cases on this point discloses the existence of two
distinct and conflicting rules both of which are broad enough to
include any case where the corporate instruments contain no
provision about participation of preferred stockholders in surplus
profits. Some jurisdictions permit participation after the
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common stockholders have received a dividend equal to the pre
ferred while others do not allow such a division of the corporate
profits.
Pennsylvania has taken the most definite stand in the matter
and the decisions in that state clearly hold that the preferred
shareholders may share, pro rata, with the holders of the common
stock when excess profits are distributed. The case of first im
pression, Fidelity Trust Company v. Lehigh Valley Railway
Company, was to the effect that all shares are equal except for the
preference stated and that preferred stockholders have all the
ordinary incidents of shareholders together with any preference
specifically given. For three years the common stockholders had
received a dividend equivalent to the ten per cent paid to the
preferred and the remaining surplus available for dividends was
divided equally between the common and the preferred at the
same rate per share on the par value. Later, however, the surplus
was not large enough to pay the ten per cent cumulative dividend
on the preferred, and when a sufficient surplus became available
the question arose as to whether the excess paid above the amount
of the preference for the three early years could be charged
against the preferred arrears of subsequent years. The court
decided that it could not be so charged, on the ground that what
the preferred had received in the way of dividends with the
common in excess of its ten per cent was a legitimate distribution
of profits. Citing no authority the court said that “when each
class of stock had been paid ten per cent., they were equal, and
equally entitled to distribution of whatever remained in the fund
applicable to dividend purposes.”
Sternbergh v. Brock is the next Pennsylvania decision in regard
to preferred participation rights. According to its facts, the
preferred stockholders, from 1899 until 1907, received their
stipulated dividends and no more, while all profits above these
amounts were distributed to the common shareholders who
received less than two per cent on the par value of their stock but
more than five per cent on the amounts which they actually had
paid. In March, 1907, a quarterly dividend of two per cent (a
rate of eight per cent a year) was declared on both the preferred
and the common stock. Sternbergh, a common stockholder, filed
a bill in equity and claimed that the preferred stockholders were
entitled to only five per cent. The contract had no participation
provision. The lower court denied the injunction on the author354
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ity of the Fidelity decision and the case was appealed. In stating
the opinion of the higher court, Justice Potter said:
“Where there is no stipulation in the contract to the contrary,
the weight of authority clearly favors the right of preferred
stockholders to share with the common stockholders in all profits
distributed, after the latter have received an amount equal to the
stipulated dividend on the preferred stock. In the absence of
special provisions, the holders of preferred stock in a corporation
are in precisely the same position, both with respect to the
corporation itself and with respect to the creditors of the corpora
tion, as the holders of common stock, except only that they are
entitled to receive dividends on their shares, to the extent guar
anteed or agreed upon, before any dividends can be paid to the
holders of common stock.”

The supreme court of Pennsylvania, therefore, affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
In Englander v. Osborne, the plaintiff’s decedent owned shares
of six per cent cumulative preferred stock in a corporation. No
dividends were paid on either the company’s preferred or common
stock until 1917, a period of nine years, when a dividend of fiftyfour per cent., covering the current year and all arrearages, was
declared and paid on the preferred, and at the same time a divi
dend of an equal amount was declared on the common. The
plaintiff brought an action to restrain the payment of the latter
dividend on the ground that the holders of common stock were not
entitled to a dividend of more than six per cent without sharing
the excess equally with the preferred shareholders. On the other
hand, the defendants claimed that the holders of common stock
were entitled to receive dividends to an amount sufficient to make
up arrearages in past years and to equalize the common and pre
ferred stock before the holders of the latter were entitled to receive
an excess above the amount of their fixed dividends and arrearages.
The lower court restrained the payment of the dividend on the
common stock, and the defendant appealed. In giving the opin
ion of the higher court, Justice Frazer made the following state
ment:
“We find nothing limiting the right of the preferred stockhold
ers to the six per cent dividend, regardless of the earnings of the
company, and in the absence of such limitation the general rule
is that such stockholders are entitled to share with the holders of
the common stock all profits distributed after the latter have
received in any year an amount equal to the dividend on the
preferred stock. The priority of the preferred stockholders rests
355
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upon the contract, and beyond the provisions of such contract
they occupy no position toward the company different from that
of the holders of common stock. When a dividend is declared,
the former are entitled to share to the extent of their preference
for the current year, and if there remains a sum more than suffi
cient to pay a similar dividend on the common stock, both classes
are entitled to share equally in the excess. In the absence of
agreement, expressed or implied, that dividends shall be cumula
tive, unpaid dividends in the past can not be claimed.”

The supreme court concluded that the above principles had
been properly applied by the lower court and consequently
affirmed its decision.
Indiana seems to be the only other state clearly in line with
Pennsylvania on this point. In Star Publishing Company v. Ball,
the supreme court of that state, speaking through Justice Town
send, said: “The preferred stockholder is just as much a party to
this venture as the common stockholders, and is entitled to all the
rights of the common stockholders, except as modified by statute
and contract.” After dividends are paid on the common stock
equal to those received by the preferred under their contract, the
preferred may participate in additional dividends to any amount.
In a Georgia decision, Coggeshall v. Georgia Land and Investment
Company, there is a dictum which conforms to the Pennsylvania
rule. In this decision, Judge Wade said:

“Preferred stock takes a multiplicity of forms but usually
possesses certain distinctive characteristics. The dividend may
be either cumulative or non-cumulative; and unless the contract
provides otherwise, preferred stockholders participate in the
surplus profits, after the preferred dividend has been declared on
the preferred stock, and an equal dividend on the common stock.”
In an early English case, the house of lords held that after
discharging all debts and liabilities and repaying to the ordinary
and the preference shareholders the capital paid on their shares,
the assets ought to be divided among all the shareholders in
proportion to the shares held. This means, of course, that
preferred shareholders would participate equally with the
common in any surplus profits in the hands of the company.
Another English decision contains this dictum in the words of
Justice Swinfen Eady:

“There is not any rule of law that shareholders having a fixed
preferential dividend take that only. It is quite open to a com
pany to distribute its revenue first in paying a fixed preferential
356
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dividend; then in paying a dividend of like amount to the ordinary
shareholders; and then dividing any surplus revenue of the year
ratably between the preference and the ordinary shareholders.”

The latest English decision in point involves a company liquida
tion. In this it was held that where there is nothing in the articles
to modify or to exclude the normal right of the preference share
holders to share in the distribution of the surplus assets, they were
entitled to rank, pari passu, with the ordinary shareholders in
such distribution. Justice Eve made the statement that:

“Nothing is said as to the distribution of any assets still re
maining for distribution after the capital has been repaid, but in
the absence of any provision to the contrary these assets—the
joint result produced by the employment of capital contributed
by both classes of shareholders—ought to be shared by the
contributors.”
Now let us consider the status of stock dividends from the
standpoint of preferred participation. If the voting control of
the corporation is undisturbed and the right to share in assets
upon dissolution is not impaired, and there is no contract to the
contrary, the preferred may participate in stock dividends as well
as in cash distributions under the Pennsylvania rule. In Sterling
v. Watson, the voting cumulative preferred stock could be retired
at the option of the corporation upon the payment of par value
and accrued and unpaid dividends. Eight years after a twentyfive per cent common stock dividend had been distributed
equally to both common and preferred stockholders, the company
decided to retire the preferred and sought to deduct the par value
of the stock dividend from the total amount due to the preferred
stockholders under their contract. The court denied the right
to make this deduction on the grounds that the contract meant
that the preferred dividends must be in cash and that the pre
ferred shareholders were entitled to participate with the common
in the stock dividend on the authority of the Fidelity Trust and
Sternbergh decisions. According to Justice Elkin:
“When the preferred dividends are paid, and dividends out of
the net earnings from year to year of an equal amount have been
declared and paid on the common stock, then all of the stock,
common and preferred, has the right to participate in the dis
tribution of the surplus earnings upon an equal basis. . . . The
principle is sound and maintained by the great weight of au
thority.”
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The original and generally accepted understanding in business
and financial circles is that after the preferred stockholders get
their specified dividend they are not entitled to participate, and
if the rest of the profits are paid out by the corporation in the form
of dividends such distributions go entirely to the common stock
holders. This is usually called the English rule.
The first time that the question of preferred participation rights
appeared before the American courts was in Scott v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company. According to the report of this case, the
preferred certificates provided that the holders should be entitled
to such dividends as the directors might declare “up to, but not
exceeding, four per centum before any dividends shall be set apart
or paid upon the common stock.” A preferred stockholder
claimed the right to participate in the whole of the surplus re
maining after payment of the preference or, failing in that, the
right to participate in so much of the surplus as remained for
dividends after the common stock had received a dividend equiva
lent (whether as to rate or amount was not stated in the opinion)
to that received by the preferred. The court denied both rights
upon the ground that, if the words “not exceeding” did not limit
the dividend rights of the preferred stock—if these words did not
mean that the holders of preferred stock were entitled to four per
cent and to no more in any circumstances—then the words were
meaningless.
The plaintiff in this case contended that the whole purpose
of the certificate was to declare what the preferred shareholders
were entitled to before the common stockholders were entitled to
anything. The language of the certificate is ambiguous, to say
the least. It might be taken to mean that no more than four per
cent should be paid to the preferred either before or after any
dividends should be set apart or paid on the common, or it might
mean that no more than four per cent should be paid to the
preferred until that amount had been paid to the common.
Under the first construction, the words “not exceeding” would
limit the total amount and under the second there would be no
such limitation.
If the express terms of the preferred contract with the corpora
tion, as evidenced by the stock certificate, allocate surplus earn
ings as a fund out of which such dividends as may be declared
must be paid on stock other than the preferred, preferred stock
holders are not entitled to participate in surplus earnings in addi
358
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tion to the amount specified in their contract with the corporation.
This was the decision in a Virginia case in which the court said:
“Our conclusion, then, is that there is no error in the decree,
and that the preferred stockholders . . . are limited to five per
cent dividends in any fiscal year, and can not participate further
in the surplus net profits for such year because by their contract
they have expressly accorded to all of the other stockholders the
paramount and hence exclusive right to have dividends therefrom,
subject only to the legal and proper discretion of the board of
directors.”
In Keith v. Carbon Steel Company, the court held that a holder
of non-cumulative six per cent preferred stock, who had received
his preference dividend in full, was not entitled to restrain the
corporation from paying accumulated earnings amounting to
nearly half its capital exclusively to the common. According to
District Judge Orr:
“The holders of preferred stock must be deemed to have been
unwilling to take the same risks as the holders of the common were
willing to take. In other words, they were not willing to take
their certificates without an expression thereon of the amount
which they were entitled, respectively, to receive out of the
profits. . . . We are unable to see why, in contracts such as these
before us, the expression of the amount to be received under the
contract should not be deemed to be an exclusion from the minds
of the parties of any additional amount. ... A certificate of
stock does not ordinarily express the share of the profits which a
stockholder shall receive from the corporation, and therefore the
law implies a term in the agreement that the holder of such
certificates shall share equally in the profits set apart by the
management for the payment of dividends. There can be no
implication, however, where the contract expressly states the
percentages which one contracting party is to receive from
another.”

In two early English decisions are judicial dicta to the effect that
profits set apart by directors for depreciation, insurance and im
provements go to the ordinary shareholders exclusively, although
there are preferred shares entitled to a preferential dividend of five
per cent. The court made this statement: “It is generally as
sumed that where the preference shares are given a fixed prefer
ential dividend at a specified rate that impliedly negatives any
right to take any further dividend, and probably this assumption
is well founded.”
In Will v. United Lankat Plantations Company, the view is
taken that a cumulative preference is a limitation of the total
359
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amount. In other words, preferred stockholders are denied the
right of participation. According to the facts, the holders of ten
per cent cumulative preferred stock had prior rights over the
common as to capital and dividend. The company sold part of
its business for cash and 45,000 fully paid shares of the purchasing
company. It paid ten per cent to the preferred stockholders and
distributed the shares to the common. A preferred stockholder
sued to have the distribution declared illegal on the ground that
the preferred should share, pari passu, with the common in excess
of ten per cent on both classes. This case is unique as one
of first impression in England. According to Cozens-Hardy,
master of the rolls:
“It is remarkable that, although preference shares have been
known for so many years, . . . and although during all those
years preference shares . . . have been well known and dealt
with in millions, not an instance has been called to our attention
in which the claim now set up has been called to our attention.”

Justice Joyce of the chancery division allowed the contention of
the plaintiff, but the court of appeals unanimously reversed the
lower court and expressly held that in the absence of any con
trary provision in the statute or contract the preferred was entitled
to only the stipulated dividend. On appeal, the house of lords
unanimously affirmed this decision.
The decision in the Will case apparently is based upon the
court’s interpretation of the contract, and the following statement
occurs in Palmer’s Company Precedents: “It is generally assumed
that where the preference shares are given a fixed preferential
dividend at a specified rate that impliedly negatives any right to
take any further dividend, and probably this assumption is well
founded.” Lord Haldane said: “Shares are not issued in the
abstract and priorities then attached to them uno flatu, and when
you turn to the terms on which the shares are issued you expect
to find all the rights as regards dividends specified in the terms of
the issue, and when you do find these things prescribed it cer
tainly appears to me unnatural to go beyond them, and look to the
general provisions of an article which is only to apply if nothing
different is said.” Cozens-Hardy, master of the rolls, declared:
“One can not be aware to any extent of what goes on in the stock
market without knowing that preferential shares of stock are
ordinarily spoken of and regarded, and I think properly regarded,
as shares of stock which carry a fixed preferential dividend and are
360
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entitled to nothing more.” According to Lord Justice Farwell:
. the birth of preference shares limits in its very inception
the whole of its attributes. It has a preference, and such a prefer
ence as is given to it by the resolution, and no more; and I should
have said that ever since I have been at the bar, or have had
anything to do with company matters, that has always been
perfectly well understood.”
In the case of Collaroy Company, Limited v. Giffard, the articles
provided that “the preference shares shall confer the right to a
fixed cumulative preferential dividend. . . .” The court decided
that the use of the term “the right” instead of “a right” showed
conclusively that it was not intended that the preferred shares
should have any right other than the preference.
Canada apparently follows the English rule. In Ramsay v.
Steel Company of Canada, Limited, Justice Orde said:
“Where the preference shares, duly created and issued, are
declared to be entitled to a fixed cumulative preferential dividend
at a certain rate per annum, any further participation in the profits
of the company is impliedly negatived, and if the right to any
further participation is to be granted it must be distinctly so
stated.”

Cases involving participation rights of preferred shareholders in
stock dividends should also be reviewed.
Niles v. Ludlow Valve Manufacturing Company is the first
decision in point. According to the facts, 4,000 shares of stock
were preferred as to eight per cent, dividends and as to capital.
In addition, the holders of this stock were entitled to equal voting
power with the holders of 3,000 shares of common stock. The
statutes of New Jersey, the state of incorporation, provided that
the preferred stock should be entitled to a fixed yearly dividend of
eight per cent., to be paid before any dividend could be declared
on the common stock. Over a period of two decades, in nearly
every year, a larger dividend was paid upon the common stock
than upon the preferred, but the holders of the latter stock made
no protest. The stockholders, common and preferred, authorized
the board of directors to distribute from surplus a 100 per cent
dividend of common stock to the holders of the common shares.
A holder of preferred, who did not vote for the measure, claimed
the right to share in the dividend and sought to enjoin the dis
tribution of it unless the holders of the preferred shares should be
allowed to participate. The lower court dismissed the bill. It
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interpreted the statutes to mean that the preferred shareholders
were entitled to eight per cent, and no more and held that the
remainder of the surplus available for dividends belonged to the
holders of the common stock alone. In affirming the judgment,
the circuit court of appeals, speaking through Judge Coxe, said:
“The common shareholders bear substantially all the losses of
adversity and are entitled to the gains of prosperity. A contract
that they should assume all the risk with no corresponding ad
vantage should be clearly established. We find nothing in the
law or the certificate or in the past action of the defendant (the
corporation) to indicate that anyone connected with the business
supposed that the preferred stockholders were to share equally
with the common stockholders in the division of surplus earnings.”
Circuit Judge Ward gave the following strong dissenting opin
ion in the Niles case:
“The general principle is that all stockholders share equally in
net profits, except as their relations are altered by statute or con
tract. If the preference is given to one class of stockholders over
the rest, it should be construed consistently with this general
principle so far as possible. For instance, if the preferred stock
holders are given the right to receive a dividend of a fixed amount
before the common stockholders get anything, the latter should
receive an equal amount, and then the surplus, if any, be equally
divided between the preferred and the common stockholders.
Where the privilege is intended to be restrictive, the restriction
should be expressed, as by saying that the preferred stockholders
are to be paid a certain dividend before the common stockholders
get anything and are to receive nothing more. In this case the
certificate of the company provided that the preferred stock
holders should be paid an annual cumulative dividend of eight
per cent before the common stockholders received anything.
There were no words of restriction. Therefore I think that they
were entitled to receive their proportion of the stock dividend in
question. It is true that the dividends had for many years been
declared and paid as if the privilege to the preferred stockholders
were restrictive, the question never having been raised, but I
think this does not prejudice the rights of the preferred stock
holder who now for the first time raises the question.”
In Stone v. United States Envelope Company, a common stock
holder sought to restrain a corporation from distributing equally
between the common and preferred shareholders a stock dividend
representing earnings employed for improvements, claiming that
as the preferred had been paid in full, all remaining profits be
longed solely to the common. According to the facts of the case,
the United States Envelope Company had outstanding 40,000
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shares of seven per cent, cumulative preferred stock and 10,000
shares of common, with equal voting power. All of these shares had
been issued except 2,500 shares of common, which the corporation
proposed to sell at $150 a share to the holders of both classes of
stock. This price was less than the value of the stock. Stone, a
common shareholder, requested an injunction to restrain the
company from selling this stock to the preferred, on the ground
that such a sale would have the effect of a dividend. The court
refused to allow the preferred to share in the purchase of this
stock and thus receive a dividend from the surplus profits of the
difference between the value of the stock and its selling price, on
the ground that the ordinary buyer of preferred shares buys with
the understanding that the maximum of his right to share in
dividends is fixed by the fact of preference and at the amount of
the preference. According to Justice Deasy: “We put the
decision, however, upon the ground that, where nothing to the
contrary appears, the creation of the preferred stock prima facie
implies that the preferential rights of the (preferred) shareholders
are given in lieu of and to the exclusion of the equality of par
ticipation which would otherwise exist.” After discussing the
Pennsylvania rule, the court said: “The other theory which we
believe to be better and supported by the weight of authority is
that in receiving the greater security of his preferential rights, the
preferred impliedly agrees to accept such rights in lieu of equal
participation.” Justice Deasy then continued with these words:
“Independent reasoning as well as what we deem to be the
preponderance of authority sustains the plaintiff’s position.
Words in contracts, as well as in statutes, should ordinarily be
construed ‘according to the common meaning of the language.’
Surely the phrase ‘preferred stock’ holds out to the ear of the
ordinary investor no promise of participation in earnings beyond
his preferential dividend. That this is true has been recognized
by the authorities.” Hence, preferred stockholders, against the
objection of common stockholders, can not be given a pre
emptive right the same as common stockholders to purchase
common stock from the corporation at a price less than the value,
since this in effect would be an additional dividend to the pre
ferred stockholders.
According to the facts of Tennant v. Epstein, 356 Ill. 26 (1934),
the plaintiff held common stock in an Illinois corporation which
had outstanding shares that were preferred as to assets on dis363
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solution and as to dividends to the extent of seven per cent.
Under the constitution of Illinois each stockholder, common or
preferred, is entitled to one vote for each share held. The board
of directors voted a dividend of common stock, one share for each
common and each preferred share outstanding. This stock was
issued and subsequently a cash dividend was paid on all common
stock which, of course, included the stock received as a dividend.
The plaintiff asked the cancellation of the stock dividend and the
repayment of the cash dividend, and the court granted his request.
It seemed that the purpose of the stock dividend was to create
a right to additional cash dividends in the holders of the preferred
stock. Consequently, holders of preferred stock, which is limited
by certificate to dividends of a specified percentage, are not
entitled to participate in a stock dividend because such dividend
is an indirect way of distributing cash surplus.
According to the facts of Borg v. International Silver Company,
the defendant corporation proposed to issue treasury stock to
both preferred and common stockholders at $50 a share, when the
par was $100 and the book value probably was more, as the com
pany had accumulated a substantial surplus. The court said:
“If it is true—and it appears not to be disputed—that the corpora
tion has a substantial surplus to which the preferred stockholders
would not be entitled in the event of dissolution, then the action
of the directors in making an offer which results in the preferred
stockholders’ getting a major portion of the proposed issue at
fifty per cent of its par value, would seem to work an injustice to
the common stockholder.” The injunction was granted. The
rule permitting the preferred stockholders to participate was
denounced by the court on the ground that it is unfair to the
holders of the common stock who should not be forced to assume
a much greater risk than the preferred holders with no better
chance for gain.
In Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Branch, a surplus was
to be distributed in the form of voting shares to the common stock
holders. The court decided that the preferred shareholders were
entitled to participate in stock dividends beyond the amount of
their preference, even though their right to dividends was limited
to the preference given. It reasoned that, if the shares were in
creased and the preferred holders were not allowed to participate,
the value of their rights upon dissolution would be decreased.
Since the preferred had equal voting power with the common, an
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increase in the number of shares would decrease the proportionate
strength of the preferred stockholders in the control and manage
ment of the corporation if they were not given a proportionate
part of the shares distributed. Justice Chichester made the
following statement in delivering the opinion of the court:
. When there are two kinds of stockholders, one preferred
and the other common, when there is no difference in their status
under the corporate charter except a preference as to dividends,
and none under the statute law, the sale of stock to common
stockholders at par, without giving the preferred stockholders an
opportunity to purchase their proportionate part under the same
conditions, or the issuance of a stock dividend to the common
stockholders to the exclusion of the preferred stockholders, is an
impairment of the rights of the latter which entitles them to relief
in equity if the stock has not been delivered, or to damages for
breach of a contract obligation if it has.”
The English rule that preferred stockholders are entitled to
their contractual dividend and no more where there is no provi
sion to the contrary has been carefully considered and solemnly
adopted by several courts in the United States, as well as in
England and by at least one court in Canada as the better view.
Aside from authority, it is believed that it conforms more nearly
to business notions than the other rule. The common stock
holders expect to receive the greater share of the corporation’s
profits. If it were not for this they would be unwilling to assume
the risk involved in subscribing to common stock. To permit the
holders of preferred stock to share pro rata in the surplus is to give
them identical benefits for a smaller consideration because, on
account of their stipulated dividend, they bear less risk than the
common. It is highly unreasonable that the holders of the
common stock should bear all the losses of lean years and that the
preferred should enjoy pro rata the surplus earnings of prosperous
years. The corporation grants the preference to the preferred
stockholders in return for giving up the right to further dividends
after the specified dividend has been paid. If participation is
intended, it may be provided for by the contract. Absence of
such provision should be construed as a denial of the right.
The participation rights of preferred stockholders, in the ab
sence of a provision in the contract, is a question that has come
before few of our state supreme courts. Since so few cases on the
point have been adjudicated, it is uncertain what view any par
ticular court will take of it, unless one of the precedents is, in the
365

The Journal of Accountancy
opinion of the court, precisely in point and binding upon it.
Since the English rule is supported by reason and by weight of
authority in this country, in England and in Canada, it probably
will be given careful consideration when the question arises in
states that as yet have no precedents on the point.
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